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Abstract
This article extends the theory of corporate risk management to encompass highly dy-
namic risks. Taking Viscusis (1989) prospective reference from the context of individual
decision making and applying it to a corporate context we propose a theory of how cor-
porations process new information. Using unique data on all terrorism insurance policies
sold in Germany we nd support for this concept of risk-updating by showing that the
demand for terrorism insurance is strongly determined by the recent occurrence of ter-
rorist attacks.
Keywords: Corporate Insurance, Risk Management, Terrorism Insurance, Expected
Utility, Prospect Theory.
JEL-Classications: D 81, D 83, G 32.
1 Introduction
The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 (henceforth, 9-11) have created an un-
precedented level of destruction. Using civilian aircraft against buildings, the terrorists
killed 2,8711 people, destroyed or severely damaged 31.1 million sq. ft. of o¢ ce space
(Fuerst, 2005) and caused one of the most expensive insured losses in history. The
bombings in Madrid, 2004, and London, 2005, and a number of attempted attacks have
since then served as reminders that the struggle against terrorism is going to last a
long time. Governments have responded to the terrorism threat by passing legislation
aimed at protecting citizens, engaging in military operations, increasing defense spend-
ing and by intervening on terrorism insurance markets. Yet, terrorism does not only
a¤ect governments. It is also a major challenge for corporate risk managers.
Terrorisms highly dynamic2 nature sets terrorism apart from most other risks that
corporations face. Terrorist organizations can change their aims, form coalitions with
other groups and embrace innovations. They are able to allocate their resources to
maximize damage and alternate between targets. The scarcity of reliable information
further complicates the task of corporate risk managers. Contrasting with the extent
of public attention, there have not been many large scale attacks conducted by globally
organized groups in either the United States or the European Union. Yet, the number of
terrorist attacks constitutes one of the main sources of information on the risk potential
of terrorist groups. Information in the media or provided by governments is likely to
be biased and aimed at reaching political goals in the war on terror.3 The emergence
of terrorism as a global security problem calls for an understanding of corporations
management of terrorism risk. In order to gain this understanding it is necessary to
inquire into the more general question of how corporations weigh new information on
rapidly evolving risks and how this information translates into corporate policy.
Unexpectedly, this question has not yet been discussed in the literature on corporate
risk management. It is therefore our goal to rst close this gap by proposing a theory
of how corporations process new information on dynamic risks and then to provide
insights into corporations management of terrorism risk4. Our analysis is divided into
1National Obituary Archive-Honor Roll (2007).
2Kunreuther et al. (2003) use the term dynamic uncertainty.
3See Wilkinson (1986) for a discussion on a number of instances during which the medias coverage
of terrorists events was subject to censorship.
4See Michel-Kerjan and Pedell (2005) for a description of the Public-Private Partnerships in France,
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four sections. First, we review the theory of corporate risk management. We then
propose a theory of how corporations process new information on dynamic risks. We
do this by adapting Viscusis (1989) prospective reference theory which was developed
for individual decision making to a corporate context. Prospective reference theory
generalizes the expected utility model. It suggests that decision makers treat their
information on probabilities as imperfect and that in the face of new information they
update their risk assessment.
Second, we provide a denition of terrorism risk and discuss the di¢ culty of accu-
rately assessing this risk. We argue that the dynamic properties of terrorism and the
lack of reliable information lead corporations to place a great weight on single and sta-
tistically insignicant events. We further describe the terrorism insurance market in
Germany. Third, we introduce our unique dataset on all terrorism insurance purchases
through the German government sponsored terrorism insurer. The dataset spans the
period from November 2002 until March 2007. During this time period corporations in
Germany were confronted with contradicting evidence. Until March 2004, Western Eu-
rope and North America were spared from large terrorist attacks. Since then terrorists
have successfully targeted Spain and Great Britain. They have also attempted to attack
targets in Germany and a number of other European countries. Fourth, we formulate
our model that accounts for the particularities of the German terrorism insurance mar-
ket. We test if recent terrorist activity has a non-declining importance for the demand
for terrorism insurance. We further analyze whether corporationsreactions di¤er with
rm characteristics and check the robustness of our model.
Our analysis leads to three main results: First, corporations assess their probability
of falling victim to a rapidly evolving risk using a mechanism that allows for dynamic
updating and which leads them to overvalue new information. Second, we observe that
corporationsrisk management activities react strongly to the level of terrorist activity
observed during the previous 12 months. Third, corporations consider the characteristics
of terrorist attacks, and they use this information to adjust their demand for terrorism
insurance accordingly.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops and extends the theory of
corporate risk management. Section 3 discusses the dynamic nature of terrorism risk
and describes the institutional arrangement for insuring against this risk. Section 4
focuses on the dataset and presents the regression models. Section 5 concludes the
Germany, and the US.
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article.
2 Theory of Risk Management and its Extension to Dy-
namic Risks
There are good reasons that corporate risk management di¤ers from that of risk averse
individuals because corporations cannot be genuinely risk averse (Jensen and Meckling
1976). Modiglani and Miller (1958) show that under the assumptions of a symmetric
distribution of information and perfect capital markets the marginal cost of capital is
not a¤ected by the rms nancing decision. Since shareholders can manage risk by di-
versifying their assets they prefer that corporations do not reduce revenue by purchasing
costly insurance coverage. Thus, managing risks should not matter to corporations.
Yet, there is a lot of evidence to the contrary. For instance, large diversied corpo-
rations are buying insurance and even insurers are reinsuring themselves5. Regarding
the theoretical assumptions, Mayers and Smith (1982), Stulz (1984), MacMinn (1987)
and Froot et al. (1993) show how managing even idiosyncratic risk can be in the in-
terest of a corporations diversied shareholders. The motives identied for managing
risks include among others a reduction in the expected costs of nancial distress and the
optimization of tax burden. Assuming costly nancing and decreasing marginal returns
on investments, Froot et al. (1993) demonstrate that risk management can help increase
a corporations value. Variation in a corporations internal cash ows may lead either
to a reduction of its investments or pressure to raise capital externally. Both adversely
a¤ect prots. The expected costs of either giving up positive net present value projects
or raising funds externally can be reduced through managing risks. Managing risk can
also lower transaction costs connected with bankruptcy (MacMinn, 1987)6. Further, a
company facing a convex tax function can benet from risk management as it helps to
smooth its prots. The expected tax liabilities on prots will be higher than the tax
liabilities on expected prots.
Summing up, due to di¤erent kinds of transaction costs corporations try maximize
a concave function. Thus, corporations behave as if they were risk averse, even if their
5See Cole and McCullough (2006) for a recent study on insurers demand for (international) reinsur-
ance.
6See Altman (1984) and Warner (1977) for an empirical investigation into bankruptcy costs.
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shareholders can diversify risks on nancial markets. This implies that the results de-
rived from the expected utility model might also hold in a corporate environment. Yet,
there is evidence that corporationsbehaviour exhibits even closer similarities to that of
individuals. Ellsberg (1961) shows that individualswelfare is a¤ected by uncertainty
over probabilities. Thus, individuals prefer a lottery with known probabilities over an-
other lottery with unknown, ambiguous probabilities. This result contrasts with the
expected utility theory that assumes that individuals are indi¤erent to ambiguity over
probabilities. Yet, ambiguity aversion can also be observed in a corporate context. While
analyzing the prices charged by insurance underwriters, Kunreuther et al. (1995) nd
that ambiguity over size and probability of losses leads to signicantly increased price
quotes. Higher prices for ambiguous risks imply that insurance corporations act as if
they are averse to ambiguity.
The standard theory of corporate risk management and its extension to ambiguous
risks assumes that risks are stable over time. This simplication appropriately captures
a corporations exposure for most risks. The risks associated with natural catastrophes,
res and accidents are predominantly stable and risk managers can rely on statistical
information based upon a large number of historical events. On the other hand, terrorism
risk is a highly dynamic risk. Thus, past assessments may not appropriately capture a
corporations exposure. To reect the dynamics and the di¢ culties of properly assessing
a corporations exposure to a highly dynamic risk we propose a new extension to the
theory of corporate risk management. We suggest applying Viscusis (1989) prospective
reference theory which was originally developed for individual decision making.
Prospective reference theory assumes that decision makers use a dynamic Bayesian
process to determine the probability of uncertain events. In the bivariate model of
Viscusis (1989) prospective reference theory, the decision maker has a prior belief of an
events probability (q). This prior belief is weighted with a parameter . This parameter
corresponds to the individuals condence in its prior belief. In the periods after this
prior belief has been formed, the decision maker views  additional trials. In these
trials he observes the outcome in question with a probability p. As a result of his prior
knowledge, the number of additional trials, and their outcomes the decision maker then
forms a posterior probability p. One obtains this posterior probability by combining
the prior information q weighted with , with the p outcomes from the  trials:
p =
q + p
 + 
(1)
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The posterior probability p is well behaved and can be used to generalize the ex-
pected utility model. It can explain the overweighing of low probabilities, premiums for
the elimination of certain risks, and the Allais paradox7.
Prospective Reference Theory has been empirically tested in a number of studies.
Viscusi and Connor (1984) analyze the risk assessment of workers in the chemical in-
dustry. In their study they provide workers, who had previous experience with handling
chemicals, with additional information (hazard warnings) on new chemicals that were
to be used on their job. In their study they nd that even very experienced workers
place a great weight on the new information about dangerous chemicals. The posterior
probability is greatly inuenced by the new information (= is very large). Viscusi and
Evans (2006) extend the analysis of worker decision processes to reect the signicantly
di¤erent probabilities reported by workers and those implied by their behavior. Jakus
and Shaw (2003) nd that hazard warnings inuence anglerschoices by investigating
the impact of sh consumption advisories on recreational shing. More specically, they
observe that an increasing severity of hazard warnings leads to increased perceived risk.
3 Terrorism
3.1 Terrorism
Terrorism, dened as the premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually in-
tended to inuence an audience(United States Department of State, 2000, xii), imposes
a very particular risk. Although terrorism itself is not new, its nature has changed dras-
tically. Over the last twenty years terroristsmotivations, organizational structures and
goals have evolved. From the 1960s to the 1980s terrorism was predominately inspired
by separation, racism, Marxist ideology, nationalism, and economic inequality (Wilkin-
son, 1986). The respective groups, among them the German Rote Armee Fraktion,
were characterized by well-dened command and control structure. They had distinct
objectives and their trained members were full-time planning, preparing, and executing
attacks (Ho¤man, 1997). Due to these characteristics terrorism was considered to be a
mainly domestic and regional risk. With the exception of countries like Great Britain,
Spain, and South Africa with a history of regional conicts, terrorism was even included
7See Viscusi (1989) for an in-depth discussion of the predictive power of prospective reference theory.
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in standard re insurance contracts.
Today terrorism is no longer seen as mainly a domestic risk. During the last decades
additional motives for terrorism have appeared, di¤erent kinds of organizational struc-
tures have emerged, and terroristsactions have gained lethality (Enders and Sandler,
2000). The 1979 takeover of the American embassy in Teheran marked the rise of a
new kind of terrorism that aims at establishing an Islamic state. The shift towards
religiously inspired terrorism has signicant implications for potential attacks because
religious groups might even view civilians to be legitimate targets. Post-cold war ter-
rorist groups have also become more amorphous: their members are often times living
regularlives and international networks, i.e. Al-Qaeda, have gained importance.
The events of 9-11 have placed terrorism among other catastrophe risks like hurricane
and earthquake risk. Yet, the dynamics of terrorism pose challenges for the accurate
risk assessment. These dynamics are illustrated by the American Department of Home-
land Securitys (DHS) Security Advisory System(DHS, 2007). The system uses ve
color-coded steps to give a broad indication of the likelihood of a terrorist attack. Red
illustrates a severe risk of terrorist attacks, orange stands for a high risk, yellow for
signicant risk and blue for a general risk of terrorist attack. The threat levels are based
on the assessment of a range of factors including current intelligence, recent events, and
what is known about terrorist intentions and capabilities. It takes both the probabil-
ity and the gravity of a potential attack into account. The system was introduced on
March 12th, 2002 at the threat level yellow. Until January 2004 the national threat
level was changed 10 times between yellow and orange. Since January 2004 the
nationwide threat level has remained at yellow. Instead of adjusting the nationwide
threat level the DHS has only placed certain regions (New York and New Jersey), air
travel, and mass transit under a higher alert status. Higher alerts are binding for the
executive branch and result in a number of measures to increase protection against acts
of terrorism.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 1 presents the chronology of the changes to the Homeland Security Advisory
System. Yet it is not only the frequent adjustments to the Homeland Security Advisory
System that demonstrate the di¢ culties even government entities face when assessing
terrorism risk. In a study conducted by the General Accounting O¢ ce (GAO, 2004)
the DHS acknowledged that there were no explicit criteria or quantiable factors used
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to determine the threat level and that these threat levels included a certain amount of
subjectivity. This subjectivity should not be underestimated.
Behavioural Economists have shown that individuals use a number of heuristics when
assessing the probability of rare occurrences. Among them is the well-known availability
heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). This heuristic leads individuals to attribute
a greater probability to events that are easily retrieved from memory. This may result
in an overestimation of the probability of recent events. In an article based upon data
from November 2001, Fischho¤ et al. (2003) provide evidence that individuals signi-
cantly overestimate their exposure to terrorism risk. They nd that 43% (19%) of their
respondents living within (outside) a 100 miles of the World Trade Center attribute a
50% or higher chance of themselves being hurt in a terrorist attack. Sunstein (2003)
suggests that individualsperception of terrorism risk might be even further exagger-
ated. Thus, subjects may be prone to probability neglect leading them to focus solely
on the bad outcome and not on its likelihood8. Yet, there exists evidence that terrorists
activities follow a cycle that is characterized by periods of high and low activity (Enders
and Sandler, 2005). A severe attack might thus signal a regime of an increased danger
of terrorist attacks.
3.2 Institutional Arrangements for Terrorism Insurance in Germany
9-11 has also resulted in one of the most expensive insured losses in history. The ination
adjusted insured damage of 9-11 is only surpassed by the losses from the hurricanes Kat-
rina, 2005, and Andrew, 1992 (Swiss Re, 2006). In fact, the 9-11 events led to important
changes on terrorism insurance markets in a number of countries including Germany.
Before that date terrorism claims were regularly included in standard re insurance con-
tracts in Germany9. Although discussions about excluding terrorism risk from regular
insurance contracts can be found in the German insurance literature from the 1970s
and 1980s, during which the country experienced a number of terrorist attacks (i.e. the
attacks on the Olympic Games in Munich, 1972, and the various attacks conducted by
the leftist Red Army Faction), the insurance industry saw no need to exclude these risks
8Contrasting evidence is presented by Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2005). A large part of the subjects in
their analysis did not acknowledge that 9-11 changed their terrorism risk assessment.
9Exclusions for terrorism risk were only regularly in countries (i.e. Great Britain, Northern Ireland,
Israel, Spain and South Africa) with a history of regional conicts.
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from re insurance contracts10. Since terrorism risk was covered by a corporations re
insurance contract, risk managers were able to treat terrorism risk separately. However,
9-11 heavily a¤ected Munich Re and Allianz (Hartwig 2002). As a consequence, ter-
rorism risk was excluded from commercial re insurance contracts in Germany and the
German government intervened by o¤ering reinsurance coverage for terrorism insurance.
Although Germany is not the only country where the government reinsures terrorism
risk, there are some particularities that distinguish the countrys terrorism insurance
scheme. Due to the regulation in Germany, government sponsored terrorism insurance
is only available from one insurer, Extremus AG. The terrorism insurance contracts are
highly standardized. Thus, they allow us to compare purchasing patterns over time.
Extremus AG, a public-private partnership, was founded in 2002, and is owned by 16
private insurance companies. Extremus is 100 % reinsured for claims up to 10 billions e.
The layer between 0 and 2 billion e is provided by the private insurance market. The
layer between 2 and 10 billion e is reinsured by the German government. Corporations
interested in government backed terrorism insurance must purchase their (standardized)
coverage through Extremus.
The primary insurance contracts o¤er compensation for property losses (buildings
and content), direct business interruption losses, and clean-up costs that were caused by
an act of terrorism. The contracts are designed as upper limit policies. For this type of
contract the policyholders payout is the minimum of the loss due to a terrorist attack,
and the upper limit (UL) selected when purchasing the contract. Another particularity
of the German terrorism insurance scheme is that only very few risk characteristics are
used to determine the terrorism insurance premium. The premium is calculated mainly
by accounting for the policyholders maximum possible loss (MPL), a number that is
obtained from the re insurance contract, and the upper limit (UL) selected by the
policyholder. It should be noted that during the time period studied Extremus did not
adjust its premiums.
10The articles include Schmidt and Gerathewohl (1973) and Hübner (1981).
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 The Data
The dataset includes all contracts sold by the government sponsored insurer from the
companys foundation in the 4th quarter of 2002 through the 1st quarter of 2007. There
are more than 1000 observations per year in the dataset. It provides detailed information
on the policyholders and the policies purchased. It names the policyholder, his address
and the nature of the business. In addition, the dataset contains the inception and
expiration date of the policy, MPL and UL. There is data on 5614 terrorism insurance
contracts11. Figure 1 depicts the number of all policies sold by Extremus since its
inception. The policyholders come from 18 industries. Most contracts, 2424, are sold to
real estate corporations. Many contacts are also bought by businesses from the nancial
sector. 513 contracts are purchased by banks, 665 by insurance companies and 530 by
real estate investment funds. Table 2 presents the number of policyholders by industry
and year.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
The data is highly skewed due to a small number of very large insurance contracts
and a large number of smaller contracts. Thus, there are signicant di¤erences between
the mean and the median of the variables reported in Table 3. The median of MPL
is e 55 million. The mean of MPL is nearly seven times larger (e 419 million) than
its median. There are 1322 (105) insurance contracts with a MPL of e 100 million (e
1 billion) or more. A corporations size is denoted by MPL which is recorded in the
regular re insurance contract and marks the sum of the insured tangible assets and the
corporations business interruption limit. Of the 5620 insurance contracts sold, 2974 are
property insurance contracts (median MPL: e 50 million). An additional 211 include
coverage against interruption of business operations (median MPL: e 55 million) and
2646 cover both property and losses due to business interruption (median MPL e 67
million). The distribution of the upper limits (UL) is less skewed12. The mean of UL is
e 77.2 million. The median of UL amounts to e 47.8 million. Consequently, Extremus
premium income depends greatly on its largest policyholders. The largest 10 contracts
11Due to the fact that terrorism insurance for policyholders with a MPL of less than e 25 million is
available from regular insurance companies our dataset is censored at this point.
12Extremus limits these to e 1.5 billion annually .
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contribute to 19 % of total premium income. The largest 100 contracts (1.7 percentile)
paid 66% of the total premium the company collected. The mean (median) terrorism
insurance premium is e 67,095 (e 11,201).
Comparing the numbers from our dataset with the overall market level data reported
by the Association of German Insurers it becomes clear that terrorism insurance is not
equally attractive for all of the 40,000 corporations in Germany that are eligible to
purchase a separate terrorism insurance policy. Of these 40,000 corporations only 2.9%
decide that the benets of a terrorism insurance policy o¤ers outweigh its costs. The
market penetration increases signicantly with the size of the company: 21% (2003)
and 15% (2004) of the 60 largest corporations (MPL > e 5 bn) purchase terrorism
insurance. A comparison of the low overall market penetration of Extremus and the
(high) relative limits chosen by its clients reveals that the terrorism insurance contracts
o¤ered appeal only to a limited number of corporations. The mean relative amount of
coverage purchased (quotient of MPL and UL) is 86%. A large part of the policyholders,
2357 of 5620, even purchases full insurance.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
4.2 Regression Analysis
The test and analysis of our proposed extension to the theory of risk management are
conducted in three steps. After accounting for the particularities of our data we formulate
our estimation equations. Using the whole dataset we rst test if recent terrorist activity
has led to changes in the demand for terrorism insurance in Germany. The analysis
focuses on the inuence of the attacks on Madrid (March 11th, 2004), London (July
7th, 2005), and the attempts to bomb two trains in Germany (June 31st, 2006). Table
4 gives an overview of the events studied. Since terrorism risk has changed drastically
over the last few years, one can assume that the knowledge about terrorism risk at
any given time is equally distributed among di¤erent corporations. Second, we analyze
whether the reaction to terrorism di¤ers according to company specic factors. Third, we
examine how well our models predict the developments of the German insurance market
by conducting two out of sample forecasts. We further apply the proposed extension to
analyze the terrorism insurers own premium projections.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
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The general attrition problem, where companies reenter the sample after leaving,
complicates a panel approach to analyzing our data. Thus, we limit to a time series
approach that in this case su¢ ces to describe the patterns of demand for terrorism
insurance in Germany. We use monthly data on (A) the change in the number of
policies insured with Extremus and (B) the change of premium income generated. Both
dependent variables reect the terms and conditions used in the terrorism insurance
contracts. The fact that the insurance contracts expire at the end of the calendar year
results in 96.9% of all contracts expiring in December. The same rule leads to a great
number of contracts incepting in January (82.3%) (see Figure 1 for details). Nearly all
contracts (97.7%) sold in January end in December. Of the total net premium income of
377 million e, 82% was generated by contracts starting in January, 99% can be attributed
to contracts ending in December. Since contracts tend to be purchased for the whole
year we also see most of the change in premium income occurring in January. Table
5 shows monthly data on both the number of policies sold and the change in premium
income.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
Standard unit root tests (ie., Dickey-Fuller) suggest that the two series are stationary
at the standard signicance levels. Further, our series do not appear to be serially
dependent. Those results have not been reported to economize on space, but they are
available upon request from the authors. In a rst step we estimate two regression
models for the whole dataset. The models explain the change in the number of policies
(Pol t ) and the change in premium income in a given month (PINC t) with the help of
dummy variables denoting January (January), the months following an attack (Attack i),
and interaction variables (Inter i). The interaction term captures the e¤ect of a terrorist
attack on the policyholderstendency to renew their contract following an attack.
We formulate the following two simple models:
Polt = a0 + a1January +
3X
i=1
aiAttacki +
3X
i=1
'aiInteri + "a (A)
PInct = b0 + b1January +
3X
i=1
biAttacki +
3X
i=1
'biInteri + "b (B)
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where i=1, 2, 3 and denote the Madrid, London, and the attempted attacks on the
German trains, respectively.
While we have data on 53 months (t=1,. . . , 53) we are only able to use information
from t=7 to t=53. This is due to the fact that it took Extremus some time to establish
its customer base. As a result it is only after March 2003 that the number of policies
sold stabilized. We conduct a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test to test for potential
problems arising from heteroskedasticity. This test (H0:Constant Variance) shows no
indication of heteroskedasticity (Regression A: @2(1)=2.53, Regression B: @2(1)=1.65). The
Bartletts periodogram-based test for white noise indicates no problems for both regres-
sions. The regression results provide evidence that the inow of new information leads
to signicant changes in the demand for terrorism insurance (see Table 6).
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
Although the coe¢ cients for the dummy variables (Attack i, i=1, 2, 3), which denote
the month of an attack, and the two months following are not signicant, we nd that the
terrorist attacks have a signicant inuence on the demand for terrorism insurance. The
interaction terms (Inter i, i=1, 2, 3), marking a January following an attack are positive
and signicantly di¤erent from zero. Our estimates suggest that the terroristsactivity
level observed during the previous 12 months has a strong and apparently not declining
importance for a companys insurance decision. The latter is not usually reversed until
the end of the year. The negative coe¢ cient for the JANUARY variable (-144 for
Regression A and -3.18 million e for Regression B) captures the drop in the demand for
terrorism insurance that resulted from the absence of major terrorist attacks on western
targets between the foundation of the terrorism insurer in November 2002 and January
2004.
The interaction variables represent the e¤ects of the attacks on Madrid and London
and the attempted train bombings in Germany on the demand for terrorism insurance.
Due to these attacks the demand for terrorism insurance in Germany did not decline
as expected during January of 2005, 06 and 07 but proved to be rather stable. Thus,
due to the Madrid and London attacks demand for insurance increased by 62 and 82
contracts, respectively. These numbers account for an increase in total premiums of
around 14.4% and 38.8%, respectively. The coe¢ cients of the interaction variables are
not declining. The relation between the prior probability and the recent experience
thus appears to be stable. Hence, corporations do not seem to get more familiar with
12
terrorism risk or at least do not perceive their past assessments to appropriately reect
their present exposure. The signicant weight that corporations place on recent terrorist
activities makes it necessary to model their risk management decisions using a concept
that integrates these dynamics.
In the second step we investigate whether a corporations reactions di¤er with respect
to its characteristics (location, nancial sector/non-nancial sector, and size). To do
this we rst divide our dataset into two groups: Subgroup 1 (Large Cities) includes
corporations with headquarters located in cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants,
while subgroup 2 (Small Towns) concerns those from smaller towns. We estimate two
multivariate regression models (C: Dependent Variable: Polt; D: Dependent Variable
PINCt ) to gain insights into the di¤erences between these groups (Table 7). While
multivariate regression models produce the same coe¢ cients and standard errors as
separate OLS, they also provide an estimate of the covariances of the residuals across
the two equations.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
Regressions C and D conrm our prior ndings. Yet, we observe that there are
signicant di¤erences in how corporations interpret the information on terrorist attacks.
The post 9-11 attacks, all of which targeted large cities, have reminded corporations
located in those cities how acute the terrorism threat is. Thus, corporations located in
bigger cities purchased more insurance contracts after each of the three attacks. This
higher demand in turn translated into premium income increases of 51.2%, 64.1%, and
55.2%, respectively. The results appear ambiguous in the case of corporations located in
smaller cities. Hence, it appears that only after the London attacks did both the number
of insurance contracts and the premium income actually increase. In contrast, it appears
that after the Madrid and attempted attacks on the German trains the premium income
actually decreased. Using the Breusch-Pagan test of independence, the two models
appear statistically independent. We further perform Wald tests to conrm that the
individual interaction coe¢ cients are signicantly di¤erent from each other (Table 7).
The test shows that the three coe¢ cients across the two subgroups are di¤erent from
each other at the 10% and 5% signicance level, respectively.
We further examine whether corporations respond di¤erently to terrorist attacks
according to their size (measured as MPL)13. Regression E of Table 8 displays that on
13We divide our dataset into to subgroups (small policyholder:MPL  mean(MPL) and large policy-
13
average larger policy holders are more sensitive to both an absence of terrorist attacks
and an increased terrorist activity. For the larger corporations the higher number of
policies bought reects an increase in premiums of around 24%14, 30%, and 20% due
to the Madrid, London and attempted German train attacks, respectively. For smaller
policy holders, the Madrid, London, and attempted German train attacks led to premium
increases of only 6%, 8% and 0.5%, respectively. Again, these results are signicantly
di¤erent across the two types of policy holders. Finally, regression F (Table 8) shows
that in response to the terrorist attacks the nancial corporations bought on average
more insurance contracts than the nancial corporations. The interaction terms appear
signicantly di¤erent across the two equations at the 5% signicance level.
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]
Next, in the third step we investigate the accuracy of the estimated equations by
inspecting the out-of-sample forecasting performance of our models. Table 9 reports the
results. Thus, we trim the last 10% of the observations from the sample (i.e. roughly
5 observations) and re-estimate the equations on the shorter sample. Using the newly
estimated coe¢ cients we obtain predictions of the previously trimmed data. To save
space, we limit this forecasting exercise to equations (A) and (B). For equation (A),
three of the actual observations fall within the 95% condence interval formed around
the forecasts. For equation (B), the number of observations predicted correctly with
95% condence increases to four.
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE]
In the nal step of our analysis we apply our ndings to the terrorism insurers pre-
mium projections. We nd that, just like its clients, Extremus places a great weight on
recent terrorist activities. When founding Extremus in 2002, its shareholders expected to
sell policies worth e 500 million annually. This number was later adjusted to e 250 mil-
lion (Extremus, 2003). However, even this adjusted gure proved to be exaggerated (see
Table 10). During the rst 14 months of operation, from November 2002 until December
2003, 1080 insurance contracts generated e 105 million of premiums income. For 2004
the company sold 1071 insurance contracts and received e 78 million in premiums. In
2005 the number of contracts increased to 1176 while the premium income decreased to
e 66 million. The following year Extremus underwrote 1195 insurance contracts worth
holder: MPL  mean(MPL).
14The precise magnitude of the coe¢ cient is obtained as ebi   1:
14
e 68 million. From January until March 2007 Extremus sold 1050 insurance contracts
that are expected to bring the company a premium income of e 59 million.
Corporations renewal rates, which denote the percentage of corporations that have
purchased terrorism insurance in the year t-1 and buy another terrorism insurance con-
tract in t, provide further support of the inuence of terrorist attacks on the demand
for terrorism insurance. Only 62% of the policyholders that bought terrorism in 2003
insurance renewed their coverage the following year. After the attacks in Madrid this
number increased to 78 %. It climbed to 86% for policies renewed in the year 2006. For
2007 the renewal rate came to 80%.
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE]
To sum up, according to the prospective reference theory, had there been more
terrorism attacks then corporations would have bought more terrorist insurance. The
discrepancies between the expected and the actual premium income appear signicant.
Yet, due to the great weight that corporations place on their recent experience, they are
not entirely unexpected. In 2002 it was impossible to know that Europe would not see
any major terrorist attacks before March 2004. Thus, the projected premium income of
e 250 million or even e 500 million may actually have been the best possible estimate.
5 Conclusion
In this article we study corporationsmanagement of terrorism risk. We extend the
theory of corporate risk management by applying a concept developed for individual
decision making to a corporate context. This concept, named prospective reference
theory, allows corporations to update their probability assessment based upon recent
observations. Using this framework we show that corporations risk management deci-
sions for terrorism risk are governed by a process that permits for a dynamic updating
of probabilities.
Looking at three major terrorist events in Europe after 9-11 we nd that corporations
tend to overweigh recent information when making their risk management decisions.
We show that the attacks on London, Madrid and to a lesser extend the attempted
attacks on German trains in 2006 led to signicant increases in the demand for terrorism
insurance in Germany. This result indicates that it is necessary to model corporations
15
risk management decisions for highly dynamic risks using a mechanism that allows for
dynamic updating and overweighs new information.
We further nd evidence that corporations also consider specic characteristics of
recent terrorist attacks when making their risk management decisions. We observe that
corporations located in densely populated areas, larger corporations, and corporations
from the nancial sector showed stronger reactions to the terrorist attacks studied in
this article. Applying the proposed extension to the terrorism insurers premium own
forecast we see that these are also largely determined by recent terrorist activities.
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Appendix
Table 1: Chronology of the Changes to the Homeland Security Advisory System: March
2002-June 2007 (DHS, 2007) .
Date Threat Level
March 12, 2002 Introduction of Homeland Security Advisory System At Yellow
September 10, 2002 Raised from Yellow to Orange
September 24, 2002 Lowered from Orange to Yellow
February 7, 2003 Raised from Yellow to Orange
February 27, 2003 Lowered from Orange to Yellow
March 17, 2003 Raised from Yellow to Orange
April 16, 2003 Lowered from Orange to Yellow
May 20, 2003 Raised from Yellow to Orange
May 30, 2003 Lowered from Orange to Yellow
December 21, 2003 Raised from Yellow to Orange
January 9, 2004 Lowered from Orange to Yellow
August 1, 2004 Raised from Yellow to Orange, specically for the nancial services sectors
in NY City, Northern New Jersey, and Washington, DC
November 10, 2004 Lowered from Orange to Yellow, for the nancial services sectors
in New York City, Northern New Jersey, and Washington, DC
July 7, 2005 Raised from Yellow to Orange for mass transit
August 12, 2005 Lowered from Orange to Yellow for mass transit
August 10, 2006 Raised from Yellow to Red for ights originating in the UK bound for the US;
raised to Orange for all commercial aviation operating in or destined for the US
August 13, 2006 Lowered from Red to Orange for ights originating in the UK bound for the US;
remains at Orange for all domestic and international ights
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Table 2: Policyholders by Industry 2002-2007
2002/3 2004 2005 2006 2007 2002-2007
Banks, Asset Managers 99 111 106 105 92 513
Construction 19 19 31 23 13 105
Utilities 19 16 16 14 13 78
Airports 26 22 20 22 17 107
Stores 36 37 42 46 42 203
Real Estate 490 452 460 530 492 2424
Real Estate Inv Funds 96 100 107 120 107 530
Churches, Foundations 21 20 19 21 17 98
Hospitals 9 5 7 7 7 35
Art, Fairs 12 10 11 10 9 52
Logistics 11 15 14 15 12 67
Media, IT 34 33 31 31 24 153
Other 18 22 21 23 18 102
Local Authorities 32 18 18 18 15 101
Tourism 26 31 38 43 32 170
Heavy Industry 28 31 36 35 23 153
Transportation 10 11 12 11 12 56
Insurance 194 118 127 121 105 665
Total 1180 1072 1117 1195 1050 5614
Number of Policies Sold by Extremus (2002 - 2007)
2003 2004 2005 2006
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
21
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics Terrorism Insurance Contracts 2002-2007
2002/3 2004 2005 2006 2007 2002-2007
Degree of Mean 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.86
Coverage Median 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Net premium Mean 89,014 73,207 59,934 57,151 56,220 67,095
(e) Median 9,558 11,246 11,389 11,654 12,858 11,201
MPL (e) Mean 5.54E+08 3.77E+08 3.78E+08 3.65E+08 4.15E+08 4.19E+08
Median 4.83E+07 5.42E+07 5.58E+07 5.86E+07 6.11E+07 5.50E+07
MPL* (e) Mean 1.80E+08 2.02E+08 1.78E+08 1.00E+08 1.17E+08 1.48E+08
Property Median 4,601,627 6,758,664 5,569,052 4,959,100 4,778,776 5,27E+06
MPL (e) Mean 5.16E+08 2.92E+08 2.85E+08 2.73E+08 2.91E+08 3.33E+08
Business Inter. Median 4.31E+07 4.63E+07 4.73E+07 4.83E+07 5.02E+07 4.72E+07
UL (e) Mean 7.12E+07 7.30E+07 7.56E+07 8.07E+07 8.58E+07 7.72E+07
Median 4.33E+07 4.64E+07 4.76E+07 5.00E+07 5.03E+07 4.78E+07
* Includes only contracts, where MPL Property, respectively MPL Business Interruption >0
MPL - maximum possible loss, UL -upper limit of compensation
Table 4: Events Studied
Event Window Event
3/2004 (-0;+3) On March 11th 2004 Madrid was struck by a terrorist attack on commuter
trains that took the lives of 190 people and wounded approximately 1500
travellers. The attack took place three days before the Spanish election
and led to a defeat of the conservative government in these elections. The
bombing wa the rst major religiously inspired terrorist attack on a European
city.
7/2005 (-0;+3) On July 7th 2005, one day after London had won the qualication for the 2012
Olympic Games, three bombs exploded in the British capital killing 52 people
and leaving approximately 700 injured. The attack was conducted by four
suicide bombers. The attacks underscored that suicide bombings might be
conducted by attackers that are born in the European Union: Three of the four
bombers were born in Britain. The July incidents were the rst suicide
attacks in Europe.
7/2006 (-0:+2) On July 31st and August 1st, 2006 two bombs were found on trains
in Germany. It was only by coincidence that they did not explode. These bombs
marked the rst major religiously inspired terrorism incident in Germany.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics: Demand for Terrorism Insurance by Month
4Number of policies sold  Premium Income (e thousands)
Month Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1 923.6 186.24 599 1054 -329.31 2431.88 -3083.16 3513.16
2 40.4 63.04 9 153 126.33 273.99 -6.34 616.16
3 30.0 40.22 2 101 306.08 840.70 -283.92 1792.69
4 30.3 36.54 5 84 272.63 499.71 4.28 1021.90
5 13.0 5.65 5 17 31.50 17.03 16.69 51.81
6 15.8 11.53 9 33 25.88 10.15 19.11 40.90
7 21.0 7.87 11 30 12.18 88.69 -107.21 106.73
8 13.3 8.96 7 26 17.94 27.49 -21.63 41.78
9 12.0 3.92 7 16 23.34 14.96 3.54 39.48
10 13.5 7.60 6 23 42.94 43.26 13.61 106.78
11 9.0 6.32 3 19 22.47 10.03 14.10 37.03
12 24.2 21.70 10 62 386.45 777.95 21.05 1777.74
Total 105.9 272.61 2 1054 81.60 789.58 -3083.16 3513.16
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Table 6: Ordinary Least Square Estimates
Regression A Regression B
Number of policies sold  Premium Income (e thousands)
January -144.65*** -38,145***
(21.43) (332,573)
Attack1 -5.66 -95,672
(11.19) (173,681)
Attack2 -7.99 -85,429
(12.74) (197,744)
Attack3 -3.66 -43,305
(12.74) (197,744)
Inter1 62.00** 1,656,964***
(29.84) (463,1480
Inter1 82.00*** 2,986,772***
(29.84) (463,148)
Inter1 1.00 2,529,191***
(29.84) (463,148)
cons 14.66*** 98,790*
(3.73) (57,894)
N 46 46
R2 0.74 0.75
Standard errors in parentheses;
*Signicant at 10 %; **Signicant at 5 %; ***Signicant at 1 %
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Table 7: Multivariate OLS Estimates by Location
Regression C (Multivariate) Regression D (Multivariate)
Number of policies sold Log Premium Income
(a) (b) (a) (b)
Small Towns Large Cities Small Towns Large Cities
January -46.88*** -92.53*** -0.060*** -0.641***
(3.69) (10.52) (0.009) (0.019)
Attack1 1.63 1.22 -0.002 0.002
(1.93) (5.49) (0.004) (0.010)
Attack2 -0.88 4.47 -0.002 0.006
(2.20) (6.26) (0.005) (0.011)
Attack3 0.13 -1.86 -0.001 0.001
(2.20) (6.25) (0.005) (0.011)
Inter1 17.00*** 45.00*** -0.309*** 0.512***
(5.14) (14.65) (0.012) (0.026)
Inter2 18.00*** 54.00*** 0.013*** 0.641***
(5.14) (14.65) (0.012) (0.026)
Inter3 -12.00** 15.00 -0.070*** 0.552***
(5.14) (14.65) (0.012) (0.026)
cons. 4.86*** 4.53** 0.006 -0.000
(0.64) (1.83) (0.001) (0.003)
N 46 46 46 46
R2 0.90 0.74 0.98 0.97
Breusch-Pagan @2(1)=0 @2(1)=0.011
Indep. Test Pr. = 0.984 Pr. = 0.916
H(0): Interia =Interib Wald Stat. P-value Wald Stat. P-value
i=1 F(1,38) = 2.90 0.097 F(1,38) = 827.62 0.000
i=2 F(1,38) = 4.79 0.035 F(1,38) = 483.59 0.000
i=3 F(1,38) = 2.69 0.109 F(1,38) = 475.22 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses;
*Signicant at 10 %; **Signicant at 5 %; ***Signicant at 1 %;
Large Cities include all cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants. Small Towns include all other.
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Table 8: Multivariate OLS Estimates by Sector and Size
Regression E (Multivariate) Regression F (Multivariate)
Log Premium Income Number of policies sold
(a) (b) (a) (b)
Large Corp. Small Corp. Non-Financial Corp. Financial Corp.
January -0.202*** -0.139*** -56.25*** -90.156***
(0.018) (0.010) (10.651) (2.709)
Attack1 -0.006 0.003 1.25 1.343
(0.009) (0.005) (5.562) (1.415)
Attack2 0.001 0.003 4.083 -0.489
(0.011) (0.006) (6.333) (1.611)
Attack3 -0.006 -0.002 0.083 -1.822
(0.010) (0.006) (6.333) (1.611)
Inter1 0.245*** 0.063*** 2 68***
(0.024) (0.014) (14.832) (3.773)
Inter2 0.303*** 0.008*** 17 68***
(0.024) (0.014) (14.832) (3.773)
Inter3 0.196*** 0.005*** -44*** 48***
(0.024) (0.014) (14.832) (3.773)
cons. 0.006 0.009*** 6.25*** 3.156
(0.003) (0.002) (1.854) (0.471)
N 46 46 46 46
R2 0.82 0.92 0.78 0.97
Breusch-Pagan @2(1)=0.412 @2(1)=2.679
Indep. Test Pr. = 0.521 Pr. = 0.1017
H(0): Interia =Interib Wald Stat. P-value Wald Stat. P-value
i=1 F(1,38) = 43.19 0.000 F(1,38) = 16.73 0.000
i=2 F(1,38) = 66.71 0.000 F(1,38) = 9.99 0.000
i=3 F(1,38) = 47.70 0.000 F(1,38) = 32.51 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses;
*Signicant at 10%; **Signicant at 5%; ***Signicant at 1%; Financial Corporations are dened as
Asset Management Corporations, Banks, Insurers and Real Estate Investment Funds. Non Financial
Corporations comprise of all other corporations. Large Corporations have a MPL > mean (MPL). Small
Corporations are all others.
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Table 9: Out of Sample Predictions for Regressions A and B
Number of policies sold Premium Income
Month Prediction Actual t-stat p-value Prediction Actual t-stat p-value
11/2006 16 4 2.73 0.01 112,130 -21,631 2.03 0.05
(4.24) (660,040)
12/2006 16 13 0.70 0.49 112,130 39,475 1.10 0.28
(4.24) (660,040)
1/2007 -130 -129 -0.05 0.96 -3,083,156 -553,966 -7.24 0.00
(22.44) (349,450)
2/2007 16 14 0.37 0.71 112,130 -4,953 1.77 0.09
(4.24) (660,040)
3/2007 16 2 3.20 0.00 112,130 8,759 1.57 0.13
(4.24) (660,040)
Table 10: Aggregate Demand for Terrorism Insurance
2002/3 2004 2005 2006 2007 2002-2007
Number of Contracts Sold 1180 1071 1116 1195 1050 5612
Net Premium Income (e million) 105 78.4 65.8 68.3 59 377
Sum of Max Possible Losses (e bn.) 653 407 422 436 436 2350
Sum of Upper Limits (e bn.) 84 78.7 84.5 96.5 90.1 434
% of Contracts renewed until t+1 62% 78% 86% 80% - 76%*
% of Contracts renewed until 2007 39% 58% 71% 80% - -
* of contracts written between 2002/3 and 2006
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